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For most of the past two decades, the U.S. accepted Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without acknowledging that a valid act of self-determination had taken place.
That formulation arose from a "realist" evaluation that Indonesia was key to U.S.
interests in Southeast Asia, that Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor was a fact not likely to be reversed, and that legitimate human rights concerns would be most effectively addressed within the context of the larger Washington-Jakarta relationship.
This year, a U.N.-sponsored referendum brought a 78 percent East Timorese vote for independence. Resulting pressures eventuated in a reluctant Indonesia's acceptance of international peacemakers. While Washington was not central to most of those developments, it was supportive, and at times instrumental, for them. This was an apparent change from the earlier policy.
This paper briefly recalls (from the author's memory) 1 the U.S. policy process of the early '90s, fast-forwards to 1999 to describe current players and their influences (based on interviews with participants) 2 , and evaluates how well the "process" has performed this year. It appears that American decision-makers in 1999 were primarily influenced by events and by our Australian ally. It is less clear that Washington overtly considered all U.S. interests. A more U.S.-centered approach may well have come to a very similar outcome regarding East Timor. Still, in general, the U.S. best supports its interests by engaging in a more structured strategic analysis and a longer-term view. 
Fast Forward to 1999
Until the Southeast Asian financial crises, Indonesia, including East Timor, The UN also pushed harder for a meaningful resolution of the independence issue.
Habibie caved. Against the advice of the military (ABRI), he agreed that the UN could organize a referendum in East Timor on independence. U.S. policy-makers reportedly
were not instrumental in that development, though they were publicly supportive. 5 Given past advocacy of UN mediation, Washington "realists" apparently concluded it would be disingenuous to temper U.S. support at a time when the GOI, itself, had gone along.
Portugal, human rights activists, and Hill advocates for the East Timor issue were undoubtedly pleased.
Contingency Planning
The U.S. began contingency planning for the possible contribution of peacekeepers to a force which Australia, East Timor's neighbor across the Timor Sea, was prepared to raise to maintain order if, as expected, the population voted for independence and Indonesia then removed its troops. 6 The Aussies, once the strongest supporters of Indonesia's claim to East Timor, more recently had reversed themselves and had urged
Habibie to accept the referendum idea. Still, Canberra was paranoid that any serious instability in East Timor could unleash a flow of refugees to Northern Australia shores and had offered to play a major role in any post-referendum peacekeeping operation (PKO). Australia made clear it would highly value a U.S. contribution.
The PKO contingency-planning process brought USG "peacekeeping" offices more prominently into deliberations. The NSC, particularly the Global Issues shop, coordinated planning with regional and peacekeeping offices within State, the Office of The international community, including the U.S., had not anticipated such a sudden, massive explosion of violence. UN credibility was on the line. Australia moved rapidly to implement its offer to lead a force of peace-keepers. There was a hitch though. All external powers agreed that Indonesia, which still claimed "sovereignty" over East Timor and maintained thousands of combat troops there, would need to give permission for the PKO. Jakarta was very reluctant to do so, insisting it could restore order. An urgent topic of the Deputies' conversations was how to convince Jakarta to permit Australia's PKO to enter East Timor. There reportedly was no explicit evaluation of how application of pressure on Jakarta might affect longer-term U.S. interests in Indonesia. Instead, the Deputies drove to a quick consensus based on a moral imperative:
the militia violence simply could not stand. It directly refuted the UN referendum and was causing the deaths of innocent people who had voted relying on UN assurances of safety. The U.S. had to join the effort to stop the killing.
9
The UN was not lobbying, though it obviously was interested. Portugal was pressing Washington at the highest levels and human rights activists were vocal, but sources say those were not decisive influences. Reportedly, the only outside pressures which significantly buttressed the Deputies' consensus were from Australia and the Hill.
The number of Congressmen with an interest in East Timor remained small; but, as one staffer explained, it doesn't take many members to lead a majority of colleagues when the issue is whether to condemn violence such as was seen last September. Senators Leahy and Feingold proposed legislation to bar U.S. support for IFI assistance to Indonesia.
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The Deputies agreed to threaten rapidly escalating sanctions with deadlines, which were explicitly explained to the GOI. The USG encouraged other influential nations to add their leverage. Jakarta remained adamant past the first deadline, triggering a suspension of all U.S. military assistance. Only two days prior to the second deadline, which would have had the U.S. vote down IFI aid that Indonesia still desperately needed, Jakarta folded and "invited" the Aussie PKO in. (Note: the Leahy/Feingold bill failed in the final days of the legislative session; but fear that it might pass despite Indonesia having bowed to the PKO worried the Clinton Administration throughout the fall.)
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A second subject for the Deputies was how to respond to Australia's intense pressure for U.S. involvement in the PKO. The Aussies were desperately anxious for visible USG involvement, to add the sole-superpower's political credibility to their effort.
Canberra insisted strongly and at the highest levels that it was time for Washington to repay past frequent and sizable GOA contributions to U.S.-led operations around the world. Those factors had resonance; and the USG, of its own accord, surely saw an opportunity to encourage regional allies, in the post-Cold-War age, to grasp regional PKO leadership when necessary rather than rely on the U.S. to do so. The Washington tendency reportedly was to accept Australia's policy judgments, since the Aussies were closer to the scene, and to focus on the importance of standing beside our ally. All but JCS accepted from the first that the USG should contribute.
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The JCS initial opposition, in the words of one involved staffer, "reflected the military's standard view that the USG should always reject involvement of U.S. troops in operations short of open warfare." Also, JCS argued that Australia could do the job on its own, in good part due to equipment from, and training with, the U.S. Another staffer said the response from non-DOD officials was, per usual, to wait for OSD to bring JCS around. Reportedly, very senior discussions between civilian and military leaders within the Pentagon did take place, and, in short order, all were in agreement to back our ally and contribute to the PKO.
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On the question of just what that contribution should be, decision-making was also by consensus. It was simply accepted that putting U.S. combat troops into East
Timor had "no bounce." Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo had left no enthusiasm in any quarter for putting American forces seriously in harm's way in such a backwater.
Staffers report that even the Aussies apparently anticipated as much and never asked for U.S. combat forces, not even informally. That made it relatively easy to commit about 200 support troops --communications, intelligence, and transportation specialists --along with equipment including lift assets, to the operation. While Washington publicly claimed the contribution to be assets the U.S. was uniquely capable to provide, staffers said that wasn't quite so. Many of the U.S. forces played marginal roles and, after the initial publicity, were gradually withdrawn. Such questions can help decision-makers focus on key issues in deciding whether to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. Yet how many of those questions were addressed explicitly as the U.S. decided to help intervene in East Timor? My sources indicate that distaste for the brazen, bloody, and apparently ABRI-backed challenge to a UN referendum plus a desire to back our ally Australia overwhelmed most other thoughts.
14
Comments about the Process
17
On the other hand, the Deputies did judge there was insufficient "bounce" to send a U.S.
combat force, an indication that limited U.S. interests were factored in, to some degree. However, the U.S. and a regional ally may well have different interests and perspectives.
An example is the previously mentioned Australian paranoia that hordes of Indonesian refugees will flow south one day, seeking a haven. That worry is deep-seated, including among some senior GOA leaders, and it colors Australian judgments about Indonesia and East Timor. However, it is hard to find evidence that most ordinary Indonesians or East Timorese, many of whom still live poor, crowded, and oppressed lives, are pining to climb on boats and travel to Australia. Most are very loyal to family and culture and appear to see their future within their homeland.
While there are benefits in encouraging regional allies to take the lead in regional humanitarian matters, there are risks in accepting that an ally's interests, and judgments based on those interests, are ours. To the extent we sacrifice our independent judgment and rely instead on that of an ally, we may at times damage relationships with other nations which our own interests would not require damaging. The argument somewhat parallels that of strategic thinkers who warn that a threat-based national-security policy would allow others to dictate where and when we act. 18 Again, in the East Timor instance, it may be that an independent evaluation of U.S. interests, costs, and risks brought us to the position we took. But the generalizing point is the danger in accepting even a close ally's judgments absent an independent evaluation of our own interests.
I'll conclude by returning to basic decision-making. None of my sources mentioned PDD 25, which sets guidelines and conditions for involvement of U.S. troops in international operations. One source did note that the PDD 56 process for complex contingency operations was developed to guide decisions on issues like East Timor but was not invoked. 19 The source opined that the result probably wouldn't have been much different had formal processes been followed. Perhaps not. However, ad hoc decisionmaking --via a flurry of phone calls by senior policy officials who haven't previously been immersed in the specifics of the crisis under consideration --inevitably risks mistakes, no matter how bright, savvy, experienced, and collegial the senior officials are.
History may confirm that the Deputies came to the best possible conclusions on East Timor this year. If so, I propose that result was in spite of the informal process utilized, not because of it.
1 The author was a political officer at Embassy Jakarta from 1987-90, the Indonesia Desk Officer at the
